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Panel II:  
That’s a Fine Chablis  
You’re Not Drinking:  
The Proper Place for Geographical 
Indications in Trademark Law 
 Moderator: Justin Hughes∗ 
 Panelists: Lynne Beresford† 
Annette Kur‡ 
Kenneth Plevan§ 
Susan Scafidi|| 
MR. MASKEL: Good morning.  My name is Greg Maskel, and 
I am the Managing Editor of the Fordham Intellectual Property, 
Media & Entertainment Law Journal.  The IPLJ has been looking 
forward to today for quite some time, and we are so glad to 
assemble a conference to discuss cutting-edge issues in intellectual 
property law. 
The IPLJ publishes four books per year, and we are currently 
working on our seventeenth volume.  Please stop by our table in 
the Atrium and have a look at our most recent books. 
Now we will begin our second panel of the day, where the 
panelists will discuss geographical indications in trademark law. 
We have a distinguished moderator for the panel, Professor 
Justin Hughes.  Professor Hughes teaches intellectual property, 
 
∗ Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (New York). 
† Commissioner of Trademarks, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Washington). 
‡ Professor, Max-Planck Institute for Intellectual Property (Munich). 
§ Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (New York). 
|| Visiting Professor, Fordham Law School; Professor of Law & History, Southern 
Methodist University (Dallas). 
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Internet law, and international trade courses at Cardozo Law 
School here in New York.  He also serves as Director of the Law 
School’s Intellectual Property Program.  He was an attorney 
advisor at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office from 1997 to 
2001.  Prior to that, he clerked for the Lord President of the 
Supreme Court of Malaysia and worked in private practice.  A 
well-known expert in intellectual property law, Professor Hughes 
is a frequent witness at congressional hearings and has written 
extensively on Internet, copyright, and patent law.  He has taught 
at Cardozo since the year 2000. 
Professor Hughes. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Thank you. 
We have a great panel today.  Although this is the trademark 
panel, the subject is actually GIs.  Now, when you go and tell 
someone that you were at a panel on GIs today, they will assume 
you were at a hospital or a medical center.  I had this incident arise 
with a very important IP professor, when I said, “we’re doing GIs,” 
and she asked about my health. 
But, no.  Here GIs are geographical indications.  Geographical 
indications are a very interesting and unusual form of intellectual 
property.  When we talk about them as geographical indications, 
we are really speaking at the level of international legal norms.  
“Geographical indications” is the right term for this type of 
intellectual property at the international level, where the TRIPs 
Agreement protects geographical indications.1 
The TRIPs Agreement’s protection of geographical indications 
is quite unusual in that the Agreement first provides for general 
protection for all geographical indications,2 and then affords 
special, elevated protection to geographical indications that 
concern wine and spirits.3 
 
 1 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 22–
24, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 
I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs]. 
 2 See TRIPs art. 22. 
 3 See id. art. 23(1)–(3).  For a complete discussion of these provisions, see Justin 
Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate about Geographical 
Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299 (2006). 
PANEL_II_FINAL_050807 5/8/2007  1:00:31 PM 
2007 GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 935 
The most important—and in a way the most interesting—
aspect of the TRIPs Agreement’s geographical indications 
protection is the fact that the TRIPs Agreement itself calls for 
continued negotiations regarding further protection of geographical 
indications in three areas of the Agreement.4  Those of you who 
have studied international intellectual property and the TRIPs 
Agreement know that this is quite unusual.  The patent provisions 
and the copyright provisions of TRIPs, as well as its other 
trademark provisions, are all self-contained.5  But here, in the area 
of geographical indications, the disagreement between the United 
States and the New World countries on the one hand, and the 
European Union on the other hand, was so strong during the 
Uruguay Round that, at best, the parties could agree to continue to 
disagree. 
Although the TRIPs Agreement uses the phrase “geographical 
indications” at the international level, different countries fulfill the 
obligations the Agreement establishes in different ways.  In 
particular, there are two general paradigms for fulfilling 
geographical indications obligations in the TRIPs Agreement. 
The first is a system that emanates from and really originates in 
France.  This is a system of appellations d’origine controllées, a 
centralized system of special sui generis protection, which you see 
in many European Union countries. 
The other system, which is mainly rooted in the United States, 
but also popular in many other countries, including I think Japan 
and China and Canada, protects geographical indications through 
trademark law, and in particular through certification and 
collection of trademarks. 
So there is a very strong paradigm difference here.  The 
paradigm difference is rooted truly in the fact that geographical 
indications are the point where intellectual property meets 
agricultural policy, where geographical indications meet different 
conceptions of the market versus industrial policy. 
 
 4 TRIPs arts. 23(4), 24(1). 
 5 TRIPs arts. 9–14, 27–38, respectively. 
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What are geographical indications?  Well, geographical 
indications include CHAMPAGNE and CHABLIS wine; 
BOURBON and IRISH and PISCO whiskey; FETA and 
ROQUEFORT cheese; KOBE beef; SWISS chocolate.  As you can 
see from a list like that, geographical indications—for those of us 
who try to study the subject—require serious empirical research, 
which takes us often to dangerous places, like Napa Valley.  I am 
mainly a copyright professor, but I can honestly say geographical 
indications have treated me very well. 
Now, we have a distinguished panel today to talk about 
geographical indications.  I will introduce them briefly. 
First, leading off our panel is Lynne Beresford, who is the 
Commissioner of Trademarks at the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office.  Lynne and I have known each other for many years and—I 
have to put my plug in now—Lynne is also an Adjunct Professor 
on the Cardozo Law faculty.  But more importantly than that, if 
you just knew Lynne Beresford as the Commissioner of 
Trademarks at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, you would 
be badly underestimating her résumé, because Lynne is probably 
one of the world’s most influential trademark experts.  She was for 
many years the chairperson of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization’s (hereinafter WIPO) Standing Committee on 
Trademarks. 
Next to her is Annette Kur.  We are very fortunate to have 
Annette in New York this year.  She is normally at the Max Planck 
Institute, where she is a researcher and head of the unit at the 
Institute that works on intellectual property.  She also is an 
Associate Professor at the University of Stockholm.  Sometime I 
am going to ask her about her frequent-flyer-mile account between 
those gigs, Munich and Stockholm. 
Next to her is Ken Plevan, who is the co-chair of the Skadden 
Arps intellectual property practice.  Ken, of course, needs no 
introduction as an intellectual property expert.  You don’t get to do 
IP at Skadden Arps at all, let alone head the IP Group, unless you 
are quite eminent in the field. 
And finally, last but not least, is Susan Scafidi, who is here as a 
Visiting Professor at Fordham Law School, but normally is a 
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Professor at Southern Methodist University.  Susan has written 
some very, very interesting work on the relationship between 
cultural issues and intellectual property, and I am sure that we will 
hear from that perspective. 
With that, I am going to turn it over to Lynne Beresford to start 
us off with a presentation.  Each of our speakers gets twelve 
minutes, except for Commissioner Beresford, who gets eighteen. 
[See article below in lieu of presentation transcript.]6 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Thank you, Lynne. 
As you saw, I think one of the most helpful slides from 
Commissioner Beresford was the three-part slide showing the 
demands that the European Union has made in what was 
essentially the Doha Round negotiations, three parts.  Those 
demands all stem from what I introduced earlier when I mentioned 
that that the TRIPs Agreement is unusual, in that it calls for 
continued negotiations over the protection of geographical 
indications.7  So you saw the claw back list, which is forty-one 
terms; the international register; and the Article 23 extension of 
protection.8 
Let me say a word about that to give you a little background 
here.  Article 22 of the TRIPs Agreement essentially affords all 
geographical indications protection at the trademark level.9  The 
level of protection the TRIPs Agreement affords to wines and 
spirits, however—as I said earlier—is elevated, something more 
 
 6 Lynne Beresford, Geographical Indications: The Current Landscape, 17 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 979 (2007). 
 7 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 8 See Beresford, supra note 6, at 989. 
 9 TRIPs art. 22(2)(a)–(b) provides that: 
In respect of geographical indications, Members shall provide the legal means 
for interested parties to prevent: 
(a) the use of any means in the designation or presentation of a good that 
indicates or suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical area 
other than the true place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to 
the geographical origin of the good; 
(b) any use which constitutes an act of unfair competition within the meaning 
of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967) . . . 
TRIPs, supra note 1.  Because article 22(a) requires that the public be “misled” by a 
label, this is essentially the confusion-based standard familiar in trademark law. 
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akin to an American trademark scholar’s conception of dilution 
protection,10 or at least dilution protection within certain product 
categories.  The question is whether this heightened form of 
protection should expand from protecting only wines and spirits to 
covering all geographical indications—such as ROQUEFORT, 
FETA, KOBE beef, and SWISS chocolate.  This is the fight about 
future standards. 
There is also a fight about preexisting standards, which I think 
Annette might speak to just a little bit, but not very much.  While 
the Doha Round negotiations were taking place, the United States 
and Australia were suing the European Union in the World Trade 
Organization (hereinafter WTO) dispute settlement system, 
arguing that the European Union’s geographical indication system 
does not permit, or has not to date permitted, foreigners to register 
and receive the full protection of geographical indications in the 
European Union.11 
The Dispute Settlement Body at the WTO reached a judgment 
largely in favor of the United States and Australia, but with some 
important conclusions in favor of the European Union.12  The 
 
 10 TRIPs art. 23(1) eliminates the confusion requirement vis-à-vis names on wines and 
spirits: 
Each member shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent use 
of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines not originating in the 
place indicated by the geographical indication in question or identifying spirits 
for spirits not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication 
in question, even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the 
geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by expressions 
such as “kind,” “type,” “style,” “imitation,” or the like. 
TRIPs, supra note 1.  This eliminates the possibility of many non-confusing labels, such 
as “fake Scotch” on a scotch-like liquor or “imitation Cognac” on a fortified wine. 
 11 The United States initiated its case in June 1999. Request for Consultations by the 
United States, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/1 (June 1, 1999).  In 
2003, the WTO combined the American complaint with a parallel Australian complaint 
and created a panel to hear the unified complaints as one action. See Constitution of the 
Panel Established at the Requests of the United States and Australia, European 
Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs, ¶¶ 1, 3, WT/DS290/19 (Feb. 24, 2004). 
 12 Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005) 
[hereinafter WTO Panel Report on Origins Regulations].  See Hughes, supra note 3, at 
328–31 (discussing aspects of the WTO Panel Report on Origins Regulations). 
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European Union modified its law effective earlier this year, I 
believe.13  Is that correct, Annette? 
DR. KUR: Yes. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: And so, while none exist yet, maybe 
there will be, eleven, twelve, thirteen, or even fourteen years after 
the TRIPs Agreement, some non-European geographical 
indications protected under European Union law. 
With that as a bridge, I would like to introduce Annette Kur, 
who, as I said, is head of the Intellectual Property Research Unit at 
the Max Planck Institute, an extremely influential—probably the 
most influential—IP think tank in Europe.  With that, Annette, take 
it away. 
DR. KUR: Thank you very much, Justin. 
Just let me say that we may be influential in some areas, but we 
definitely have nothing to do with the GI regime that has applied 
to-date in Europe. 
First of all, I am really very glad to be here and to be on this 
panel. 
I feel a bit uncomfortable, though, not because I am the only 
European—and this is, of course, a very contentious area between 
the U.S. and the EU—but rather on the contrary, because I agree 
on far more points with Lynne than I disagree.  However, being 
here as a European, I think that I should make an effort to defend 
the European position. 
But I also have to emphasize that what appears as “the” 
European position from the outside—and what is indeed adopted 
and endorsed by EU representatives in international negotiations—
is not really a common European position.  It is rooted in a system 
well developed in individual countries, especially in France, and 
also in Italy and to some extent in Spain, i.e., countries around the 
Mediterranean Sea.  It certainly does not come from Germany or 
other countries in Northern Europe such as the United Kingdom or 
the Scandinavian nations.  Nowadays, it also has some support in 
 
 13 See Council Regulation 510/2006, On the Protection of Geographical Indications and 
Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2006 O.J. (L 93) 12 
(EC). 
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the new Member countries of Eastern and Middle Europe, which 
harbor their own strong agricultural traditions. 
This brings me back to something that Lynne said, to which I 
simply must subscribe. Is this a trade issue rather than an 
intellectual property issue?  Yes, it is.  It is about trade policy in 
the first place. 
Is it about agricultural policy?  Yes, it is.  The legislative 
initiative that lead to the regime for specific GI protection that 
currently applies in the European Union was brought forward by 
the agricultural department of the Commission,14  rather than the 
Directorate-General for the Internal Market, which is generally 
responsible for propelling intellectual property harmonization 
legislation. 
On all these points, I concur with Lynne’s statements.  
Nevertheless, it remains true that specific protection of GIs does 
form part of intellectual property law.  In the end, this depends on 
the exact definition of GIs, but it is important to note that Article 
1(2) of the Paris Convention mentions GIs as one of the fields 
industrial property protection covers.15  In addition, as we have 
heard, TRIPs also explicitly addresses GIs.16  Therefore, 
technically, there is no way of denying that GIs count as a specific 
area of intellectual property law. 
Next question: are GIs the same as trademarks?  I had the 
impression that Lynne’s statements to some extent endorsed this 
conclusion.  Here again, I have some reservations.  In my opinion, 
there are some differences between GIs in a general sense and 
trademarks.  The most notable of these differences is that 
trademarks belong to one individual trademark holder and laws 
normally consider them transferable property.  GIs, on the other 
hand, are inherently collective, and not just in the sense that 
collective entities own certification marks or collective marks.  
 
 14 The Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development. 
 15 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Stockholm Act of July 14, 
1967, art. 1(2), 828 U.N.T.S. 307 (“The protection of industrial property has as its object 
patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, 
indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair 
competition.”). 
 16 TRIPs, supra note 1, arts. 22–24. 
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Irrespective of the establishment of specific associations for 
registering GI, GIs exist by themselves, wherever and whenever 
signs make reference to products originating from certain regions.  
At least in this sense, GIs differ from, and go beyond, the 
trademark system.  They are rather part of a general regime of 
protection against misrepresentation.  The international community 
adopted this type of protection as the basic rule underlying Article 
22 of TRIPs.17 
I therefore submit that we should acknowledge that there are 
certain merits in a GI protection regime that is not exactly the same 
as a trademark protection scheme.  Registration and assignment of 
a sign to an individual rights holder is not integral to GI protection.  
GI protection is rather a collective right that exists independently, 
simply because the public assumes that specific products come 
from certain regions, and thus ascribes the qualities of such 
products to such regions.  This is the basic concept. 
The question, then, is this: can or should the law impose 
additional protection regimes on top of this basic concept, and if 
so, what form should such enhanced regimes take? 
First, I should clarify that protection by way of certification 
marks is an excellent way of granting additional protection to GIs.  
This option exists in both the United States, and Europe.  Lynne 
said it already, but let me emphasize this point here again: in the 
EU, we do not just protect GIs with a sui generis system; we also 
provide for protection with certification marks. 
But indeed, in addition to that, European law has adopted a 
specific system for GI protection: the GI Regulation (hereinafter 
GI-R).  The printed material for this conference included the text 
 
 17 See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(1) (“Geographical indications are, for the purposes 
of this Agreement, indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a 
Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other 
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”); see also 
TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(2)(b) (referencing article 10bis of the Paris Convention, the 
general clause-like prohibition against unfair competition). 
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of an amended version of the GI-R that went into effect earlier this 
year.18 
Scholars can criticize the type of protection the GI-R 
established from a number of directions.  For one, the regulation is 
extremely complicated and formal.  It also restricts competition,19 
as well as the ability to use GIs in commercial speech,20 to a degree 
so extensive that might it appear quite precarious.  On the other 
hand, there is no denying that it may produce, in principle, 
beneficial effects in the agricultural sector, which would vary in 
import amongst the individual countries of the EU.  As was stated 
above, it was these benefits to agricultural industries that 
precipitated the introduction of the GI-R. 
Ultimately, however, we must leave the problems the GI-R 
created for the Europeans to sort out among themselves.  If this is 
the sort of regime a majority of the EU countries wants to establish 
as a Community rule, who is to criticize them?  As long as the GI-
R scheme only implicates the regulation of EU-internal matters, 
the EU is surely free to do what it wants. 
However—and this is another point where I have to concur 
with what Lynne has pointed out21—when the EU imposes such a 
regime as a specific category of intellectual property law falling 
under the ambit of TRIPs, there is an obligation under international 
law to make such protections accessible to nationals from all 
countries subscribing to TRIPs.  It is not permissible to create a 
regime the protections of which only citizens of certain favored 
 
 18 Council Regulation 510/06, On the Protection of Geographical Indications and 
Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2006 O.J. (L 93) 12 
(EC). 
 19 See, e.g., Case C-108/01, Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma & Salumificio S. Rita 
SpA v. Asda Stores Ltd. & Hygrade Foods Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-5121, I-5194–95 
(proscribing the slicing and packaging of ham marketed under the GI-protected term 
“Prosciutto di Parma” beyond the confines of the Italian region of Parma, the only region 
authiorized to produce hams bearing such a name); Case C-469/00, Ravil S.A.R.L. v. 
Bellon Imp. S.A.R.L., 2003 E.C.R. I-5053, I-5119 (barring the grating of cheese sold 
under the GI-protected name “Grana Padano” outside of the Italian regions authorized to 
produce such cheese). 
 20 Council Regulation 510/2006, On the Protection of Geographical Indications and 
Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, art. 13, 2006 O.J. (L 93) 
12, 19 (EC). 
 21 See Beresford, supra note 6, at 997. 
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countries may enjoy, and this is precisely what other TRIPs 
member countries have accused the EU of doing. 
The issue has been the object of WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings.  The panel report that arose from these proceedings 
criticized the EU for trying to impose a system that, while claiming 
to be accessible to everyone, was actually exclusive in that it made 
it practically impossible for individuals from countries outside the 
EU to obtain protection under the GI-R unless such individuals’ 
home countries employed regulatory schemes analogous to the GI-
R.22  In practice, the EU effectively forced other countries to 
establish systems for orchestrating the certification and monitoring 
of GIs analogous to the EU system as a precondition of registration 
under the GI-R.  The WTO Panel found that this action on the part 
of the EU clashed with the principle of national treatment.23 
As was said before, the EU recently amended this system in 
response to the WTO Panel report.24  At least on paper, the 
European Union has introduced changes that make it possible for 
stakeholders from non-EU countries to apply to register GIs in the 
EU without pre-examination or regular monitoring of the GI 
protection regimes in such individuals countries of origin.  I cannot 
say how this has worked out in practice, I am not an expert on that, 
and in addition, the amendments are quite recent.  Perhaps we need 
more time in order to see whether anything comes out of these 
changes, at least with respect to whether the EU will now, and in 
the future, accept American GIs for registration in Europe.25 
Of course, in practice, any changes hinge upon American 
producers actively pursuing applications under this system.  People 
dealing with these issues in the European Union have told me that 
 
 22 WTO Panel Report on Origins Regulations, supra note 12, ¶¶ 7.72, .74, .102. 
 23 See id. 
 24 See Council Regulation 510/2006, On the Protection of Geographical Indications and 
Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2006 O.J. (L 93) 12 
(EC). 
 25 While the EU had not registered any non-EU geographical indications as of the time 
of this Panel, by spring 2007 Brussels appeared to be moving to registered its first few 
non-EU GIs, including “Napa.” Paul Franson, More wine regions join push for place 
protection, ST. HELENA STAR (Cal.), Apr. 5, 2007 (reporting that “the European Union 
recently announced that Napa Valley has been named a Geographical Indication, the first 
wine region in North America to gain the protection and recognition of this designation”). 
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lack of interest is indeed the main reason why there is so little 
movement regarding GI protection of American designations of 
origin in Europe.  They told me instead that all Americans really 
want to see is that the certification mark system applies in the 
European Union in exactly the same manner that it applies in the 
United States. 
Contrary to that, Lynne told me just before we started that 
American producers are genuinely interested in gaining access to 
GI protection in Europe.  Again, I am not expert enough to judge.  
I can only hope that the changes the EU made to the GI-R in the 
wake of the WTO Panel report have improved the legal situation 
enough to rule out any discriminatory effects that would clash with 
international obligations. 
Let me now use the very last minute of my time for another 
topic Lynne addressed in her presentation: the question of whether 
and in what manner the global community should extend the 
regime of international GI protection.  Should it, for instance, 
introduce a registration system modeled on the system that 
presently applies in the EU?  Should it expand Article 23 of 
TRIPs26 so that it grants absolute protection—irrespective of the 
likelihood of consumer confusion regarding geographical origin—
to GIs for all types of products?  Like Lynne, I can only caution 
against the introduction of such systems, which would create chaos 
and simply prove unmanageable. 
As an illustration of this point, it is of note that before the last 
session of the WIPO Standing Committee on Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications, and Industrial Designs convened in 
November, 2006, the Permanent Mission of Brazil in Geneva 
communicated a list of some 5,000 indications of indigenous plant 
names that it maintained should be excluded from trademark 
 
 26 TRIPs art. 23(1) (“Each Member shall provide the legal means for interested parties 
to prevent use of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines not originating in 
the place indicated by the geographical indication in question or identifying spirits for 
spirits not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in question, 
even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the geographical indication is used 
in translation or accompanied by expressions such as ‘kind’, ‘type’, ‘style’, ‘imitation’ or 
the like.”). 
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protection.27  Although these plant names are not exactly the same 
as GIs, this move on the part of Brazil goes in the same direction 
as would a regulation exempting all sorts of national GIs from 
worldwide trademark protection.  To establish such a system on an 
internationally mandatory basis would simply be crazy. 
Again, in this regard I find no argument in defense of the 
official European position.  In my view, it is clear to see that such a 
position is not going to benefit anyone. 
As my last point, I want to emphasize that my last statement 
also pertains to developing countries.  The EU sometimes 
advertises its position as a tool for promoting the development 
agenda because GIs offer a good way of protecting—at least in an 
indirect manner—traditional knowledge extant in developing 
countries by granting the exclusive right to use the names of 
regions from which traditionally manufactured products 
historically originate in commerce only to such regions.  I think 
that the argument is inherently flawed.  If—as in the case of the 
Brazilian plant variety list mentioned before—this would lead to 
countries communicating to one other, and claiming exclusive 
protection of a huge number of such designations—who can 
seriously believe that anyone will actually derive substantial profit 
from such practices?  The most likely results are merely the 
creation of additional impediments for trademark protection and, 
ultimately, chaos.  Thus, I really do not think that this is a tenable 
position.28 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Thank you, Annette. 
One thing that happens in a panel like this is that since 
everyone is so expert, we often may not be explaining everything 
that is going on in our heads as we go on.  So let me try to fill in a 
little bit on some things. 
 
 27 World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Communication from the 
Permanent Mission of Brazil, at 2, WIPO doc. SCT/16/7 (Sept. 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_16/sct_16_7.pdf. 
 28  See Annette Kur & Sam Cocks, Nothing but a GI Thing: Geographical Indications 
under EU Law, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 999 (2007) (companion 
piece to Dr. Kur’s presentation). 
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What Lynne and Annette refer to as the European law, we 
commonly call the “Origins Regulation.”29  The case that Australia 
and the United States brought against the European Union on the 
Origins Regulation had a couple of different and distinct claims. 
Originally—as Annette correctly described it—one of the main 
claims was that the EU system required a country to have a 
parallel, equally strong geographical indications appellation system 
as a precondition of EU registration.30  So, obviously, the United 
States was not eligible; Jamaica was not eligible; lots of countries 
were not eligible, particularly in the New World. 
There were also procedural hurdles in the Origins Regulation 
that made it simply impossible for Jamaicans, Colombians, Sri 
Lankans, or Americans to apply, because as the EU originally 
drafted the Origins Regulation, it required that a European Union 
member government present an application for registration.31  Of 
course, if you are a Sri Lankan, you do not have a European Union 
member government to present your application. 
So there were many problems with the Origins Regulation.  
Perhaps the recent amendments have ameliorated these issues, but 
it is too soon to know with any certainty. 
Annette is completely correct in stating that European Union 
countries also have certification mark systems.  One vast problem 
that the EU member countries have failed to work out amongst 
themselves is the relationship between geographical indication 
protection at the EU level and certification mark protection in 
different countries.  I know Lionel Bentley at Oxford has written 
about this, for example.32 
 
 29 Council Regulation 2081/92, On the Protection of Geographical Indications and 
Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 1 
(EC), superseded by Council Regulation 510/2006, On the Protection of Geographical 
Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2006 
O.J. (L 93) 12 (EC). 
 30 See WTO Panel Report on Origins Regulations, supra note 12, ¶ 7.38; Hughes, supra 
note 3, at 328. 
 31 See Hughes, supra note 3, at 326. 
 32 Lionel Bentley & Brad Sherman, The Impact of European Geographical Indications 
on National Rights in Member States, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 850 (2006). 
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Now, finally, everyone has been talking about this Article 23.33  
You need to understand the difference Annette was talking about 
between Article 2234 and Article 23.  Article 22 states that 
countries are required to protect geographical indications at a 
confusion standard—a likelihood of confusion, or deception 
standard—familiar to any trademark law practitioner in any 
country.35  Article 23 affords wines and spirits an additional non-
confusion-based standard of protection, a kind of protection that 
you might think of as a dilution standard of protection—French 
law describes it as usurpation protection—that protects the mark 
against any usurpation by anyone else.36  This obviously is an 
extremely strong kind of protection. 
I make that kind of introduction because our next speaker, Ken 
Plevan, who, as I said, is one of the co-heads of the IP practice at 
Skadden Arps—and I failed to mention he is also an adjunct 
faculty member here at Fordham where he teaches advanced 
trademark law, so this is really an all-professor panel here—is of 
the view that the law protects trademarks and GIs against dilution 
too stridently, and at the expense of free expression.  With that, I 
would like to turn it over to Ken. 
MR. PLEVAN: Thank you. 
 
 33 TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 23. 
 34 Id. art. 22. 
 35 See id. art. 22(3). 
 36 Article 3 of the Lisbon Agreement, the multilateral agreement dedicated to 
geographical indications in general, expressly mentions the “usurpation” standard.  See 
Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International 
Registration, art. 3, Oct. 31, 1958,  923 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Lisbon Agreement].  In 
the TRIPs negotiations, the EU originally proposed this standard for all geographical 
indications. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 318–19.  The French “usurpation” standard for 
the protection of geographical indications stems from article L. 115-5 of the Code de la 
Consommation. See C. CON. art. L. 115-5 (FR.) (“[L]e nom qui constitue l’appellation 
d’origine . . . ne peuvent être employés pour aucun produit similaire. . . . Ils ne peuvent 
être employés pour aucun établissement et aucun autre produit ou service, lorsque cette 
utilisation est susceptible de détourner ou d’affaiblir la notoriété d’appellation 
d’origine.”) [The name that constitutes the appellation d’origine cannot be used for any 
similar product. They cannot be used for establishment or any other product or service, 
when this use is likely to divert from or weaken the reputation of the appellation 
d’origine.]. 
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Professor Hughes commented before about the problems you 
encounter when you have a panel where everyone is an expert, so I 
want to take a different approach today and explain first why I 
actually know nothing about these topics. 
When Hugh Hansen called me and left a message, I thought he 
said he wanted me to speak on geographical limitations, i.e. 
territorial restrictions, which is a field I know something about, so 
it came as quite a surprise when I found out today’s topic was 
geographical indications, which I knew nothing about.  I tried to 
get my partner to handle the presentation, and that is why my name 
is not in the program.  Yesterday he told me he was too busy to do 
it.  I think it is useful on every panel to have one speaker who 
knows nothing about the topic, to try to give a fresh approach to it. 
Now, regarding my qualifications on this topic, I did not know 
what that raisin symbol stood for, I did not know until yesterday 
that popular deli meat had anything to do with a place in Italy, and 
I certainly did not know that parmesan cheese had something to do 
with the region of Parma in Italy.  I am not, however, afraid to 
pronounce “Montepulciano” in a public audience. 
I also remember—and this is accurate—when I was first old 
enough to eat in a restaurant—and these were not, believe me, 
fancy restaurants, this would have been in the early-to-mid-
1960s—that I used to go in and ask for Roquefort dressing on my 
salad.  Even in those inexpensive places I was dining in at the time, 
the menus all changed over a period from the late-1950s to the 
mid-1960s.  So “Roquefort” disappeared and the term “bleu 
cheese” replaced it.  Even the waiter or waitress, the person who 
was serving me, if I said “Roquefort dressing,” they would say 
“bleu cheese.” 
So now I open it up so you all can decide whether or not we are 
worse off for that or better off for that.  But we certainly at that 
time got used to the fact that ROQUEFORT, as I learned this 
morning, is a registered mark, so you can’t describe a dressing as 
Roquefort unless the bleu cheese in it comes from the appropriate 
region in France. 
What I wanted to talk about this morning at least for some of 
my time—as Professor Hughes indicated—is the question of 
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whether if we were to apply that higher standard, the property 
rights standard, for wine and spirits in the United States, whether 
that would qualify, or pass muster, under the First Amendment.37  
So what I am really talking about is not trademarks, but rather the 
matter of genericness.38 
What it seems to me that this would do is take words and 
phrases or descriptions, geographical indications that are already 
generic, and considered so by consumers in the United States, 
remove them from this category, and give them some kind of a 
property right. 
Historically, there is very little interface between trademark 
law and First Amendment law.  I have been listening carefully.  
Commissioner Beresford did not mention the First Amendment at 
all in her presentation.  So why not?  Why is the First Amendment 
unimportant in the context of trademark law? 
The main reason is that trademark infringement requires 
deceptive or misleading speech,39 and what we are talking about 
today is a property right that does not inherently contain deception.  
This is what Judge Kozinski, in the Mattel Barbie Doll case, 
referred to as “the First Amendment compass of trademark law;”40 
the compass that inherently keeps trademark law away from First 
Amendment problems, because of the requirement that you must 
have a likelihood of confusion in order to prevail in an 
infringement case.41 
Now, there are some other buffers.  One, of course, is the 
genericness exception.  Generic marks are not trademarks, and thus 
do not fall under the ambit of trademark protection.42 
The third buffer is the fair use doctrine. 
 
 37 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 38 See, e.g., 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 12:1 (4th ed. 2007) (addressing genericness). 
 39 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (“making actionable the deceptive and misleading 
use of marks in [] commerce”). 
 40 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 41 See id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
 42 See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 38, § 12:1. 
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So what law would apply?  Well, the law that you would apply 
to this heightened property right would presumably be the test that 
the Supreme Court set down in the Central Hudson case,43 which 
is still good law.  Central Hudson is the test you apply if the 
government is trying to proscribe commercial speech that is not 
deceptive, but truthful.44  The government must have a substantial 
interest, the regulation must directly advance the government’s 
stated interests, and it cannot be more extensive than necessary to 
serve this interest.45 
As far as some case law, there is the case of San Francisco Arts 
and Athletic, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee.46  In this case, a 
group in San Francisco decided that they were going to hold the 
Gay Olympics.47  Statutory law states that the U.S. Olympic 
Committee has the exclusive right to use the Olympic symbol and 
the word “Olympics,” I believe, for all commercial purposes,48  so 
the U.S. Olympic Committee sued and obtained an injunction 
against this group in San Francisco.49  This was back in the mid-
1980s. 
The Supreme Court heard the case in 1987.50  In a series of 
opinions, meaning the court split 5-2-2—there were two 
concurring and dissenting opinions—the Court upheld the statutory 
restriction on use of the Olympic symbol and the word Olympics.51  
The Court examined the rationale behind Congress’ decision to 
protect the Olympics and held it to be valid.52 
Now, this was not a perfect Central Hudson case in that the 
Court did not fully apply the Central Hudson analysis, because 
there was at least a comment in the majority opinion that use of the 
term Olympics in the “Gay Olympics” might cause consumer 
 
 43 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 557. 
 44 Id. at 564. 
 45 Id. 
 46 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 47 Id. at 525. 
 48 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (2000). 
 49 San Francisco Arts, 447 U.S. at 527. 
 50 Id. at 522. 
 51 Id. at 548. 
 52 Id. at 532–35. 
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confusion.53  The Court did construe the statute as proscribing 
truthful, non-confusing speech, but it also found that the 
proscriptions the statute established protected a substantial 
governmental interest.54 
There is also the somewhat older case of Friedman v. Rogers, 
which involved regulations on optometrists in Texas.55  Texas law 
proscribed the practice of optometry unless you used your own 
personal name.56  You could not use a business name, like “North 
Houston Optometrists.”  The Supreme Court suggested in this case 
that trademarks are a lower form of commercial speech because in 
contrast to other forms of commercial speech that provide 
information about price, quality and the like, trademarks “have no 
intrinsic meaning.”57 
With this background, I still question very much whether in 
today’s climate the Supreme Court would find that Congress has a 
proper governmental interest in protecting wine growers in foreign 
countries under American law.  I think it would be very difficult 
for the Court to uphold such legislation under the weight of a 
serious First Amendment challenge. 
Importers certainly can put down on their parmesan cheese 
where it came from, and they can say “this is true, genuine, 
Parmigiano Reggiano cheese, made in the Parma region of Italy.”  
So there are other ways of identifying such products.  And, 
presumably, the many Americans willing to pay the extra twenty to 
thirty percent for the better quality of authentic regional products 
would be able to figure this out.  For those, frankly, who do not 
care about quality and authenticity, why should they pay this price 
premium? 
The analogy is, of course, the federal dilution statute.58  First, 
we could say: are American trademark holders and the Patent and 
Trademark Office great defenders of the First Amendment?  Well, 
probably not.  It is probably really more of an economic thing.  We 
 
 53 Id. at 539. 
 54 Id. at 536–39. 
 55 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 3 (1979). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 12. 
 58 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). 
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know that from the federal dilution statute, because the owners of 
the most powerful trademarks in the world lobbied Congress to 
enact the statute.  What did these powerful trademark owners want 
the dilution statute to protect?  I suggest they wanted it to protect 
the sensibilities of vice presidents of marketing at powerful 
companies who are somehow offended when someone else uses 
their company’s trademarks without actually causing confusion.  
Now, is that a substantial government interest?  It probably is to a 
Republican Congress.  I wonder whether the Congress in office 
today would have passed the dilution statute if the bill were up for 
vote today. 
I personally think that the dilution laws are of dubious 
constitutionality.  I hope that someday the Patent and Trademark 
Office will concur, and withdraw their regulations that try to adopt 
references to dilution in the registration process. 
But, obviously, the First Amendment is a very particular U.S. 
phenomenon.  It does not, as I understand it—I may be wrong—
apply in the rest of the world.  So Americans do approach these 
sorts of problems differently than do Europeans. 
It is a bit like the territorial restriction, in that what is right in 
the United States is not necessarily right in Europe.  One of the 
reasons for this is that European consumers have a different view 
on these things than American consumers. 
Like the great example of the dispute between Budweiser and 
Budvar that has been going on for years in Europe.59  It would be 
very difficult, I think, to convince many American beer drinkers—
who, but for this legal dispute, would probably have no knowledge 
of the fact that Budvar is a province in the Czech Republic 
historically renowned for centuries for making beer—that there is 
confusion over these two beer-related terms in parts of Europe, for 
there is certainly no confusion in the United States. 
So I defer to everyone else on the panel to figure out how we 
harmonize two clashing interests, where everything works fine 
 
 59 See generally Hughes, supra note 3, at 329–30 (noting the nature of the ongoing 
dispute between Anheuser-Busch, owner of the Budweiser brand of beer, and the Czech 
town of Budvar, a historical beer-brewing locale, and the lack of any palpable resolution 
to this matter). 
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here in the United States; and, on the other hand, legitimate 
interests may well exist—particularly at that lower level of 
protection in the context of deception—because European 
consumers have different reactions than American consumers. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Thank you. 
Well, a “clash of interests” set things up appropriately for 
Susan, because in addition to being a Visiting Professor here at 
Fordham and a Professor at Southern Methodist University’s Law 
School, Susan is also the author of a book entitled Who Owns 
Culture? Appropriation and Authenticity in American Law,60  so 
she has spent a huge amount of time thinking about issues of free 
expression and free markets versus identity and identity politics 
and a sense of belonging as well as a sense of ownership in 
cultures.  So I think it is excellent to have Susan bringing this 
together for us as a wrap-up speaker. 
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: Thanks, Justin. 
Thank you so much, Hugh, for inviting me to speak, and to 
members of the IP Law Journal for organizing this event. 
When Justin mentioned that he was speaking on GIs, people 
asked him about his health.  When I mentioned the same thing to a 
colleague, he said, “Oh, we’ll never get them out of Iraq.”  So 
there is much confusion over exactly what we are talking about 
today, but I can assure you I will do my best to stay on topic. 
I am speaking today about the relationship between 
geographical indications and cultural property, particularly 
intangible cultural property.  Justin was kind enough to mention 
the book Who Owns Culture?, in which I substitute the term 
“cultural products” for “intangible cultural property,” because it is 
shorter to type, and also emphasizes the ongoing nature of cultural 
production in the form of things like cuisine, dance, dress, music, 
and traditional medicine.61 
 
 60 SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE? APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN 
AMERICAN LAW (2005). 
 61 Id. at ix–x. 
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With this juxtaposition between GIs and cultural products in 
mind, I would like to turn back to a discussion of the categories of 
GIs.  Under TRIPs, there are two different levels of protection for 
two different types of GIs: wines and spirits, on the one hand, and 
a second category labeled, “other.”62  I believe it is possible to 
subdivide further the category of “other.” 
One could find all the examples of GIs the panel has offered 
today on the menu at a nice cocktail party—wine, cheeses—and 
Justin happily mentioned chocolate, which I was pleased to hear.  
In other words, all of the common examples used in the EU-U.S. 
debate on geographical indications are comestible, whether in the 
form of alcoholic beverages, or food and agricultural products. 
The definition of GIs, however, is comprehensive enough to 
encompass not only food and drink, but also other categories of 
local creativity.  In particular, it can include articles of manufacture 
or handicrafts.  Although articles of manufacture that qualify for 
protection as GIs exist in Europe—Swiss watches or Turkish 
carpets, for example—they have particular significance in the 
developing world.  In the interest of broadening this panel beyond 
the concerns of the global North, it is important to focus on 
handicrafts as well as food and drink. 
Now, as you know, the TRIPs Agreement describes rights that 
are negative, rather than affirmative.  While TRIPs mandates that 
subscribing nations provide legal means of preventing misleading 
uses, it does not require member countries to provide for 
registration of GIs as a separate protected category.  Each country 
may choose to fulfill its TRIPs obligation either by creating a 
specific registry for GIs, or by simply incorporating them within a 
system of trademarks and preventing misleading registrations, as 
Lynne said.63  TRIPs provides greater protection for wine and 
spirits, barring not only use of inaccurate designations, but also use 
of such designations alongside words like “style,” “type” or “kind” 
that could foster confusion.64 
 
 62 See TRIPs, supra note 1, arts. 22–23. 
 63 Id. art. 22(2). 
 64 Id. art. 23(1). 
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In order to understand fully the scope of GI protection in the 
TRIPs Agreement, it is necessary to go beyond the definitions and 
requirements in TRIPs and compare them with some other 
definitions.  TRIPs’ definition of GIs, of course, requires that a 
protected good have “a given quality, reputation, or other 
characteristic [that] is essentially attributable to its geographic 
origin.”65  In other words, the TRIPs requirements are stricter than 
mere indication of source. 
TRIPs, however, is somewhat less specific in this regard than 
its predecessor treaty on appellations of origins, the 1958 Lisbon 
Agreement, which requires that the quality and characteristics of a 
good be “due exclusively or essentially to the geographical 
environment, including natural and human factors.”66  Membership 
in the Lisbon Agreement has always been somewhat limited; 
membership was originally a European consortium joined inter 
alia by Mexico, an interesting example to which we will return 
shortly.67 
Given my role as a scholar of culture, I am particularly 
interested in the human factors that are part of the geography 
mentioned in Lisbon, and might arguably be implicit in TRIPs as 
well.  I would argue that they are most relevant to the third 
category I suggested to you within GIs, articles of manufacture or 
handicrafts. 
Surely, when we focus on wine and spirits, the knowledge and 
experience of the winemaker is important.  Perhaps this is less so 
when we are talking about a farmer growing VIDALIA onions—I 
don’t know how much specific human knowledge and skill that 
involves as compared with growing generic onions, but then, I’m 
not an onion farmer.  When we focus on handicrafts, however, the 
input of the artisans is arguably more important than the input of 
things like climate, and other aspects that, if we were discussing 
wine, we would call the terroir.  The category of handicrafts is the 
one that most overlaps with the things that I have studied in the 
 
 65 Id. art. 22(1). 
 66 Lisbon Agreement, supra note 36, art. 2. 
 67 For a list of nations currently adhering to the Lisbon Agreement, see WIPO, 
Members of WIPO Bodies, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en& 
search_what=B&bo_id=11 (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
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realm of intangible cultural property, and so I will focus on this 
category for the rest of my time. 
Lynne has already noted the relationship between the function 
of trademarks and the function of GIs, as has Annette.  I would add 
that geographical indications, or at least appellations of origin, also 
serve a purpose related to what I have called “authenticity marks” 
in other work, the kinds of marks that may take the form of 
collective marks but whose most important role is to allow a 
cultural group to establish a formal relationship between the 
community at large and the goods or cultural products that such a 
group creates. 
Annette also noted that communal nature is an important 
attribute of GIs.  From this perspective, I believe that GIs serve an 
attributional function by allowing communities to capture the 
additional economic value of authenticity, something like what 
Ken described, rather than just a grant of economic monopoly.  For 
example, everyone can join the winemakers of Champagne in 
making champagne, but the rest of us just have to call it “sparkling 
wine.”  GIs are not a limit on actual creation of these goods, but 
rather mere a constraint on nomenclature. 
Some examples of legal attempts to facilitate the use of 
communal marks or attributive marks outside of the GI context 
include things like the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990,68 as 
well as similar public-private efforts to protect the Maori in New 
Zealand69 and aboriginal peoples in Australia, although in 
Australia the particular mark is no longer active.70 
The difference, then, between geographical indications and 
other kinds of authenticity marks or attributional marks is that the 
latter focus on membership in cultural groups rather than on 
 
 68 Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1159 & 25 U.S.C. §§ 305, 305d, 305e (2000)). 
 69 For information about the “Maori Made” mark, see Creative New Zealand Arts 
Council of New Zealand Toi Aotearoa, The Toi Iho Maori Made Mark, 
http://www.creativenz.govt.nz/funding/other/toi_iho.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
 70 For information about the Australian National Indigenous Arts Advocacy 
Association’s former label of authenticity program, see Arts Centre of Australia Online, 
Certificate of Authenticity, http://www.artslaw.com.au/LegalInformation/Indigenous/ 
Certificate%20of%20Authenticity.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
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physical or geographical location, although in the case of many 
indigenous groups or local groups there is substantial overlap 
between the two.  In other words, the categories of familial 
relationship and physical location can be roughly coextensive. 
Of course, focus on membership has its own problems.  Who is 
a member of a Native American nation?  Who has the right blood 
lines?  Who has lived in an area long enough to be part of the 
community?  This set of issues, however, does not arise in the 
context of geographical indications. 
Human migration, of course, makes establishing the 
relationship between human artisans and geographical indications 
much more complicated.  One of the typical U.S. objections to 
protection of GIs that Lynne did not mention is the issue of 
emigrants, people who leave their countries—artisans who leave 
their countries in the current example—who wish to continue their 
work elsewhere.  This phenomenon informs the Old World/New 
World debate that persists in the international dialogue regarding 
GIs, as compared with the usual global North/South debate that 
exists in other areas of IP law. 
In my view, the reality of emigration is an issue that the law 
must address in the context of GI protection for articles of 
manufacture and handicrafts.  How should the legal system treat a 
craftsperson who leaves his or her country and wishes to continue 
producing an artisanal good elsewhere and referring to it by its 
traditional name?  This is an important concern, and one to which 
we shall return shortly. 
First, however, let us consider the question of why we bother to 
protect these products at all, especially when we are talking about 
handicrafts.  Well, I think that Annette disposed of one argument a 
little too quickly perhaps: the idea that this sort of thing can benefit 
economies and groups of individuals who produce less high-tech 
IP—in other words, the developing world.  Okay, if Brazil tries to 
register 5,000 different names, this may be a bit much, but I think 
that when we discuss support for microenterprise, these kinds of 
GIs, or attributional marks of some sort, can be important.  Allow 
me to concretize this type of initiative briefly. 
PANEL_II_FINAL_050807 5/8/2007  1:00:31 PM 
958 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:933 
I mentioned that Mexico was a member of the old Lisbon 
Agreement.  One of the more interesting aspects of Mexico’s 
participation is that has consistently maintained, alongside 
TEQUILA and AGAVE, registrations for categories of regional 
handicraft.  Specifically, Mexico protects TALAVERA, a kind of 
intricate lacquer work often seen on wooden trays and boxes, and 
OLINALA, a type of pottery. 
India is an example of a country that has more recently turned 
to GIs to protect regional handicrafts under a recently adopted 
Geographical Indications Act.71  Last week, India reported that it 
now has twenty-eight registered GIs.72  I reviewed this list.  
Approximately three-quarters of these GIs are handicrafts of some 
sort, including many textiles; none of them are wines or spirits.73  
You saw DARJEELING tea among the panel’s earlier examples; it 
is one of the agricultural products on the Indian list.  The vast 
majority, however, are handicrafts.  It has become important to 
development in rural areas of India to focus on artisans, and GIs 
may be a way to help them promote their work.  A wonderful news 
report about India’s National Institute of Fashion Technology and 
its project to send students to aid the rural poor in attempting to 
market their handicrafts underscores this point.74  Although 
registering a GI is no guarantee that economic benefit will ensue, 
the additional benefit of a recognized name—a geographical 
indication safeguarded against misappropriation—at least has the 
potential to avert exploitation of traditional names by outsiders. 
In the context of the global South, the economic potential of 
GIs offers the possibility of balancing the substantial benefits of 
the IP system the global North has reaped, even if to date European 
nations have been in the best position to develop GI-protected 
 
 71 The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999, 
No. 48, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India), available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ 
ipr/gi/gi_act.PDF. 
 72 28 Products Registered as Geographical Indications, INDLAW NEWS, Nov. 9, 2006, 
http://indlaw.com/guest/news/viewnewsDetail.asp?NewsID=1a2edd6ded7684284b51578
56327346e.xml (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
 73 See id. 
 74 Jyoti Verma, Giving Craft a Touch of Fashion, FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Oct. 15, 2006, 
http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=143468 (last visited Apr. 
10, 2007). 
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resources.  Once again, I must emphasize that GIs neither halt 
borrowing nor stop cultural interchange; they simply give 
additional weight to authenticity.  Translated into economic 
engines, the creative industries GIs protect can help preserve 
community structures and foster the kind of pride and recognition 
of community authorship that starts to sound a bit like the moral 
right of attribution in the civil law copyright system.75 
Given these benefits of GIs, and the fact that again cultural 
interchange can still occur—but without appropriation of labels—I 
tend to lean in favor of some of these protections.  As I mentioned, 
however, the plight of the emigrant artisan concerns me.  I would 
thus add a proposal, perhaps thinking far into the future, to modify 
GI protection for handicrafts only, in recognition of the fact that 
they rely more on human input than on literal geography. 
I suggest that in the case of emigrants who are pressured or 
perhaps forced to leave their homelands—whether for political, 
religious, or economic reasons—if they were artisans back home, 
they should have a limited right to continue using the geographical 
indication of the place they left, provided they also list the actual 
place of production of their goods.  This formulation already falls 
within the parameters of the TRIPs Agreement, as long as it is not 
misleading.76  In other words, a first-generation Cuban émigré 
could produce the “Down with Castro” brand of Cuban cigars, 
made in the Dominican Republic. 
This proposal would give such labeling a presumption of 
reasonableness—a presumption that the labeling is not misleading 
under the circumstances described—as an additional benefit.  I 
would also argue, however, that Cuban cigars made in the 
Dominican Republic should have a limited lifespan.  In other 
words, measures to address the problem of forced emigration and 
the issues that impact heavily on human beings and their GIs 
should expire after a limited period, perhaps the longer of the life 
of the particular émigré or a fixed term of years. 
 
 75 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act of 
July 24, 1971 (as amended on Sept. 28, 1979), art. 6bis, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 828 
U.N.T.S. 221. 
 76 See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(3) (prohibiting the use of geographical designations 
that mislead the public). 
PANEL_II_FINAL_050807 5/8/2007  1:00:31 PM 
960 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:933 
Certain geographic locations and their unique physical and 
cultural characteristics play an important role in the production of 
goods, a category not limited to food and drink.  If we are to reach 
international agreement on a system for recognizing GIs, we must 
not simply engage in a U.S.-EU debate over agricultural products 
and trade policy.  Instead, we must also attempt to balance the 
often-ignored human factors that are part of local production, 
especially in the context of handicrafts, with the desire to literally 
“spread the wealth” across the globe—and concurrently address 
our equitable concerns about whether the law should recognize GIs 
at all. 
With six seconds left, thank you very much. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: You timed yourself perfectly.  You 
actually seem to have practiced that.  Professors rarely have that 
amount of precision in the timing of their talks. 
We have forty minutes for questions and answers and 
discussion.  I am certainly happy to lead it off, taking the 
moderator’s prerogative, but I would really like to turn to the floor 
and ask people to ask their own questions, about things they did 
not understand in our presentations—clarification of the actual 
legal situation or political situation—as well as policy questions 
and policy debate issues. 
Annette? 
DR. KUR: I do not want anyone to misconstrue my statement 
at the end of my presentation that was maybe a bit too brief.  I do 
believe that providing for a system—preferably of the certification 
mark type—of designations reserved for and monitored by local 
groups of artisans is an excellent way to promote traditional skills.  
I am not at all opposed to that. 
I was arguing against the theory that indigenous communities 
would automatically profit from an extension of the GI protections 
Article 23 of TRIPs currently affords to wines and spirits77 to all 
sorts of products.  Such claims are wrong.  A type of protection 
that goes in the direction of a certification mark regime would 
better serve the relevant objectives. 
 
 77 See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 23. 
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It is also important to note in this context that the registration 
of signs as such is not sufficient.  Individuals often forget this in 
discussions.  The vital thing is to realize that marketing power 
must back GIs to make them an effective tool in commerce.  
Lawmakers often promise indigenous societies that once protection 
for their designations is secured, everything will work out fine—
that they will find themselves in the same enviable, and profitable, 
position as the makers of  “Champagne.”  This is of course not 
true.  The owners of GIs first need to make the world aware of 
their existence, and of the unique qualities of their products.  This 
requires substantial marketing efforts directed towards countries 
where customers might be willing to spend extra money on such 
products. 
These aspects of course do not automatically apply in a system 
that simply confers worldwide protection on thousands of national 
designations.  That was my only point. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: I think that is an excellent point.  The 
European Commission selling the idea that “you register this and 
you will be as rich as the champagne growers” to developing 
countries has bothered me as well. 
Of course, not to completely besmirch the European 
Commission, there is a natural tendency of lawmakers and 
bureaucrats, and probably professors, to confuse the piling-up of 
laws with the piling-up of capital.  There is a tendency to sell the 
piling-up of additional IP protection as a way to build up 
reputational capital, but as Annette said, the real issue is 
developing the reputational capital. 
Those of you who read the New York Times devoutly, in the 
past saw a story about Rwandan coffee.78  Rwandan coffee has in 
the past twenty-four or thirty-six months built up tremendous 
reputational capital, with no additional legal protection.  I do not 
even know if they have a certification mark in the United States.  
These growers are perhaps doing it with common-law certification 
mark protection, so that is a very fair point. 
 
 78 Laura Fraser, Coffee, and Hope, Grow in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, § 3, 
at 1. 
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Yes, sir? 
QUESTION: I am Zhang Naigen [phonetic] from Shanghai, 
China.  I am the Director of the Intellectual Property Center at 
Fudan University. 
I have a question for both the Commissioner and the professor 
from Munich regarding national treatment, in particular in the 
context of GIs because this is the critical issue before the panel.  I 
am wondering how to apply national treatment to GIs registered at 
the EU level, because the European Union is not a nation; it is a 
regional organization.  So how do you apply national treatment to 
GI registration at the EU level?  This is a question for both the 
Commissioner and the professor from Munich.  Thank you. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: The question was, because the 
European Union is a supernational entity, how does national 
treatment law apply in the context of GIs? 
I think that the answer to that is rather straightforward.  Go 
ahead. 
DR. KUR: The European Union has acceded to TRIPs, and 
TRIPs imposes national treatment.79  Therefore, the Community 
legislature must abide by the provisions of laws enacted at the 
Community level.  I do not think anyone would doubt that. 
QUESTIONER: But the [inaudible—off-microphone] 
indicated that the EC emphasized that it is not [inaudible] the 
TRIPs Agreement.  So I am wondering why the emphasis is on the 
EC or the EU; because for the WTO it is not EU, it is the EC, not a 
separate territory.  That is an argument from the EC.  For this case, 
I think—because the Commissioner mentioned that as of now, 
there is no registration of foreign GIs in the European Union—that 
is the fact.  Even for Chinese exporters, for example, their goods 
originated in China, not in the EC territory, so these are political 
issues.  I would like, in particular, for the Commissioner from the 
United States to address how to apply for national treatment. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: First of all, as a matter of simple 
application, because the EU GI-R creates a form of protection in 
each EU Member State, it does not matter whether you 
 
 79 TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 3. 
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conceptualize it as the European Union failing to provide this form 
of intellectual property protection or as France or Spain failing to 
provide this level of protection.  In other words, France is not 
offering to Jamaicans, Canadians and Americans the level of 
protection it provides to Spaniards, Portuguese and French, and 
that is a denial of national treatment. 
DR. KUR: Now it is getting very technical.  First, we are 
talking about a Regulation that applies on the EU level, not about 
national law.  There is no way to blame France for not granting 
protection based on an EU Regulation.  Only the European Union 
is responsible. 
The question, however, seems to address the relationship 
between the European Union and the European Communities.  
Strictly speaking, “EU” refers to the European Union, which arose 
out of three agreements, 80 of which the EC Agreement is only one.  
The EC, i.e. the European Communities, passed the relevant GI 
legislation.  This is probably why the WTO Panel report referenced 
the EC rather than the EU.  It is true, on the other hand—and this is 
what the question seems to aim at, if I understand it correctly—that 
the EU, and not the EC, has acceded to TRIPs.  Obviously, the 
panel did not regard this as a problem, probably because the 
obligations the EU incurred under TRIPs would seem to bind the 
EC as well, but this is a very technical question.  I do not think that 
we have to go into this. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: I think it is very technical, but you 
can still make the case that France as a WTO member is providing 
a form of protection.  Whether it is a Community-wide regulation 
or the Directive implemented in France, it does not matter.  It is a 
form of law. 
DR. KUR: Let’s not pursue that. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Okay. 
Another question? 
 
 80 See generally DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 233–64 (2004) (chronicling the formation of the European Union through the 1957 
Treaty of Rome, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, and the 2004 Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe). 
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QUESTION: I have a question for the final speaker, Professor 
Scafidi.  How would you suggest within your regime that—my 
concern is, say, for the Native American Arts and Crafts Act81—
how would you protect against handiwork that Native Americans 
did not actually make?  What would be the solution for preventing 
this sort of fraud? 
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: I do not have a regime yet, but maybe 
I will one day.  That is a good question. 
I think that the history of Indian Arts and Crafts Act helps 
answer it.  Congress passed the Act in response to lots of cheap 
copies of Native American jewelry—silver and turquoise 
jewelry—flooding in from other parts of the world, where 
producers manufactured it cheaply, then brought to American and 
labeled “Native American.”82  This same flood continues.  The 
difference now is that the Act proscribes this jewelry from bearing 
labels such as “Native American” or “American Indian” unless a 
Native American artisan actually makes it.83 
The question then, of course, is: what is a Native artisan?  That 
gets very complicated, because it goes back to specific tribal 
enrollments.84  Some individuals contest this system at the 
margins, because it bars some people from enrolling even though 
they have specific Native American heritage.  The system is not 
perfect. 
The benefit, however, is essentially this: if something bears a 
false label, then it is subject to challenge, as well as civil and 
criminal penalties. 
 
 81 Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1159 & 25 U.S.C. §§ 305, 305d, 305e (2000)). 
 82 See Jennie D. Woltz, Note, The Economics of Cultural Misrepresentation: How 
Should the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 Be Marketed?, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 443, 454–56 (2007). 
 83 See Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, §§ 104–105, 104 Stat. 
4662, 4663–64 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1159 & 25 U.S.C. §§ 305, 305d, 
305e (2000)). 
 84 See Woltz, supra note 82, at 450–453. 
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MR. PLEVAN: There is a deception standard inherent in the 
statute, as I recall.85 
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: Yes. 
QUESTION: I am curious regarding the issue of fair use in the 
context Article 23 and Article 22, and what exceptions, if any, 
exist.  If products such as American KOBE beef, or KOBE beef in 
general, were elevated to the level of Article 23 protection, what 
would happen to producers of such products? 
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: I think it would be a lot more serious 
in terms of wines and spirits, and I think I touched on that briefly.  
Certainly, Lynne would want to elaborate on that more. 
You would not have those fair use permissions with respect to 
wine and spirits, even if you have the correct designation alongside 
the potentially misleading designation.  With respect to everything 
else, under Article 23 it might be fine. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: I think that is right.  I do not think 
anyone believes that another country could bring a WTO case 
against the United States for our nominative fair use doctrine, for 
example,86 so I think it is not a problem under the Article 22 
deception standard.87 
Under the Article 23 standard for wine and spirits, as everyone 
has talked about, the relevant standard is really kind of dilution, or 
maybe dilution plus.88  I do not want you to think it is across the 
board, because in the Lisbon Agreement it is arguably across the 
board,89 but in TRIPs it is specific to the product category.90 
And as Susan said, you cannot say things like “imitation 
cognac,” you cannot say “cognac-like,” you cannot say “fake 
cognac.”  Now, most of us would agree that if the label says “fake 
 
 85 Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, §§ 104–105, 104 Stat. 
4662, 4663–64 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1159 & 25 U.S.C. § 305e (2000)). 
86 See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 17.  Countries may provide for exceptions to trademark 
protection, although Article 17 only expressly recognizes descriptive fair use (“such as 
fair use of descriptive terms . . . .”). Id. 
 87 See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(2)–(3). 
 88 See id. art. 23(1). 
 89 See Lisbon Agreement, supra note 36, art. 3. 
 90 See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 23(1). 
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cognac,” that is not truly confusing; no one is going to be 
confused, so if you think that this is a fair use of the term 
COGNAC, the U.S. is now obligated by treaty not to permit such 
use. 
I find that quite interesting because, if you are a trademark 
person, attach that to your ideas of comparative advertising.  We 
certainly believe that Pepsi should be able to run ads to say “we’re 
not Coke; we taste better.”  On the other hand, there is not as far as 
I know—and Ken may know much better than me—in the 
comparative advertising doctrine in the United States, any case 
where Pepsi-Cola or a company like that has put “Coca-Cola-like 
product” or “imitation Coca-Cola” on their label. 
I have a suspicion that, while we might say, “Hey, the 
comparative advertising is great,” a judge might say, “You know, 
you’ve crossed a little line there.  ‘Coke-like product’ on your label 
is going too far.”  If that is your intuition, then maybe Article 23 is 
not that far out. 
Ken? 
MR. PLEVAN: The only thing I can think of quickly is the 
case that goes something like—I always forget which is the Calvin 
Klein one that sold for $200 a little bottle—“If you like OPIUM, 
you’ll love OBSESSION.”91  It is probably the other way around, 
and maybe it is “If you like OBSESSION, you’ll love OPIUM.” 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Actually those are both brands.  
You’ve got to pick another one. 
MR. PLEVAN: But there are cases where it was that kind of a 
comparison.  I think the Second Circuit said it is just confusing 
because it is not clear; it is not a true comparison.92  The true 
comparative ad is one where you say your product is better than 
 
 91 Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 832 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 
1987).  Charles of the Ritz, manufacturer of a fragrance it billed as OPIUM that lawfully 
bore the Yves Saint Laurent brand name, actually took issue with discount fragrance 
producer Deborah International Beauty’s use of the phrase “If You Like OPIUM, a 
fragrance by Yves Saint Laurent, You’ll Love OMNI, a fragrance by Deborah Int’l 
Beauty.  Yves Saint Laurent and Opium are not related in any manner to Deborah Int’l 
Beauty and Omni” as an advertisement on the exterior packaging of its less-expensive, 
imitation scent OMNI. Id. at 1318. 
 92 Id. at 1323. 
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that of a competitor; you make a true comparison, and so no 
consumer is confused.  Those cases simply came down as 
confusion.  I do not buy those sorts of perfumes.  Those were cases 
decided in the mid-1980s. 
The holding in the classic case that applied the fair use doctrine 
to comparative advertising, the METAMUCIL case in the Third 
Circuit, is simply that no one would be confused when you make a 
comparison because you are making a clear comparison.93 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: But am I correct that those cases are 
really about advertising rather than labeling?  That is, Coca-Cola 
does not put “better than Pepsi” on its label, and we have never had 
a case about the label, rather than the advertising.  Is that right? 
MR. PLEVAN: That may be true.  I cannot think of a case 
where a competitor’s product is mentioned on a label.  But usually 
this is because there is a huge risk that if a competitor gets an 
injunction against your ad, you pull the ad and you switch it; but if 
a competitor gets an injunction against the label, you are in serious 
trouble.  So manufacturers—maybe it is partly heritage from the 
fact that in the drug arena the FDA is involved in your label, even 
though they are not involved in your advertising—historically are 
just at greater risk with packaging. 
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: I believe the perfume cases, the 
Designer Imposter cases, involved not the label, but at least the 
store display. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Yes, it was the display. 
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: So it was very close. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Yes, it was very close.  I agree it was 
the display. 
Does that help some? 
QUESTION: Just a comment on the last thing you said.  It is 
fairly commonplace in the pharmaceutical arena to go to the local 
drugstore and see generic products that state right on the label 
“compare to.”  So they actually do it.  I have not seen a case that 
decides whether this is permissible, but I have certainly seen that it 
 
 93 G.D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson Pharm. Corp., 715 F.2d 837, 843 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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is commonplace that they list “compare to,” identify a specific 
brand name for comparison, and usually place it on the shelf right 
next to the generic product so you will not be confused at all. 
MR. PLEVAN: Yes, that is absolutely right. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Very interesting. 
Annette, you had something you wanted to add? 
DR. KUR: Just in order to shock you a little bit more about the 
lengths Europeans are ready to go to protect GIs, there is an 
explicit clause in the Directive on comparative advertising 
concerning products bearing so-called “denominations of origin”94 
that proscribes comparing such products in advertisements for 
other products that do not bear the same denomination.  The clause 
is of particular importance for wines, which are thus exempt from 
the general rule under which comparisons are permissible as a 
matter of principle. 
I have wondered what the outcome would be if a party 
challenged this clause before the European Court of Justice as 
clashing with the principle of free speech.  In Europe, we do not 
have the First Amendment, but we do of course apply principles—
in particular, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights95—that protect freedom of expression.  It is therefore 
conceivable that one could challenge the clause successfully, but 
until now, no one has tried.96 
 
 94 Council Directive 97/55, art. 3a(1), 1997 O.J. (L 290) 18, 21 (EC) (“Comparative 
advertising schall, as far as the comparisson is concenred, be permitted when . . . for 
products with designation of origin [the comparisson] relates in each case to products 
with the same designation.”). 
 95 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 
10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression.  This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.  
This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises.”). 
96 The ECJ did have the opportunity recently to rule on a case dealing inter alia with 
reference made to the tradidional method of producing Champagne in beer 
advertisements. Case C-381/05, De Landtsheer Emmanuel SA v. Comité 
Interprofessionel du Vin de Champagne and Veuve Cliquot Ponsardin SA, (Apr. 19, 
2007), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit= 
rechercher&numaff=C-381/05.  In a somewhat more liberal vein than what is suggested 
in the text above, the ECJ held that the relevant provision in the directive on comparative 
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PROFESSOR HUGHES: We should add that the world of 
wine in Europe is itself a mare’s nest of regulations that we cannot 
even begin to talk about.  For example, Australians and Americans 
cannot send wine to Europe and call it “table wine.”97  Americans 
cannot use the word “chateau” on the label; we cannot use the 
word “moulin.”98  So they have a whole vast network of 
regulations beyond the geographical indications.  I am not 
surprised about the comparative advertising law. 
Is Wine Spectator legal in Europe, with numbers and 
comparisons? 
DR. KUR: I don’t know.  One might even have some doubts as 
to that. 
But as you said, it needs to be emphasized that wines are very 
special.  What we have been talking about so far is the general GI 
regulation dealing with foodstuffs and agricultural products, which 
does not cover all products, and also does not deal with wines 
because they have their special regulation, which is even more 
rigid, like you said. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Susan, I just have to ask, isn’t it a 
cautionary tale that wines are so integral to French and Italian 
identity that they end up creating a mare’s nest of regulation, and 
that when a product is a paradigmatic cultural product there is a 
real risk of this happening? 
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: I think that in so many other areas of 
the world we are so far from that level of protection that in reality 
we are unlikely to approach this problem.  It is certainly a 
cautionary tale for legislatures in terms of what laws to pass, but at 
the level of mere registration of GIs, not so much.  That is a whole 
other administrative battle to fight. 
 
advertisement “must be interpreted as meaning that, for products without designations of 
origin, any comparison which relates to products with desginations of origin is not 
impermissible.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 97 Hughes, supra note 3, at 334.  See generally Wine Institute International Department, 
European Wine Labeling Rules for U.S. Wines (2006), http://www.calwinexport.com/ 
content/Compliance/New%20US%20Labeling%20regulations%20for%20European%20
Union%202006.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
 98 NORBERT OLSZAK, LES APPELLATIONS D’ORIGINE ET INDICATIONS DE PROVENANCE 45 
(2001). 
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PROFESSOR HUGHES: I think we have a gentleman there in 
a blue shirt with a tie and a question. 
QUESTION: Hugh Hansen, Fordham Law School. 
What is a mare’s nest, Justin?  What is that? 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: A mare’s nest?  Are you serious? 
QUESTIONER: I just never heard of it.  What is it? 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: It is an imbroglio.99 
QUESTIONER: I understand what it is.  I could figure that out 
from the context.  We will have to discuss this, but when this is 
actually printed, I want you to have an etymology. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: I grew up on a horse farm.  I can 
explain it to you.  It really is what a mare’s nest is. 
QUESTIONER [Professor Hansen]: Okay, we will do it. 
This is for Annette.  Going over to Europe, I think 
geographical indications present many problems.  GIs first arose at 
a time when there was not any robust trademark law, as a form of 
trying to protect what we are now protecting as trademark, but 
trademark law as it stands also allows for horizontal competition.  
GIs, in contrast, are a sort of a throwback dinosaur in that they 
restrict horizontal competition.  I think that is why the Commission 
is pushing GIs around as a good thing, because they engender less 
horizontal competition. 
But when I went over there, I was surprised that Europeans 
actually thought of it—and tell me if I am wrong—as a good thing 
that GIs restrict horizontal competition, because part of this is a 
throwback to simpler times, when people could just sort of do 
things the way they always did, and not worry about the 
competitive effect, or the New World, or something else.  It has 
sort of an anti-capitalistic tone, at least to people I spoke to, who 
 
 99 A “mare’s nest” originally connoted something fraudulent, because female horses do 
not build “nests.”  Over time, however, this suggestion of something deceptive evolved 
into an implication of something very complicated, complex, or untidy. See, e.g., 
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 711 (10th ed. 1997) (defining a “mare’s 
nest” as either “a false discovery, illusion, or deliberate hoax,” or “a place, condition, or 
situation of great disorder or confusion”). 
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thought it was a plus of geographical indications, of insulating 
people from these influences.  Do you see any of that? 
DR. KUR: That is difficult to say.  What the EU certainly 
intended the GI regulations to do, and what they indeed do to some 
extent, is protect and preserve the traditional way of doing things.  
So if you mean that, then I could probably agree. 
It is also interesting and to some extent typical that this form of 
protection comes from France, where other, similar movements, 
like the Slow Food movement, have their origin.  In this sense, it is 
certainly correct to say that GI protection is a reaction against 
uniformity, big conglomerations, and globalization. 
On the other hand, when GIs are promoted on a large scale, 
like CHAMPAGNE, and PARMA—I may be wrong on this; 
maybe I am really biased also, coming from Germany, where we 
did not have that system, and we still do not think that it is an ideal 
thing to have—it seems to me that what is going on under the 
PARMA label both for ham and for cheese is hardly any different 
from big industry.  I therefore have some misgivings regarding the 
notion that GI regulation is all about preservation of traditional, 
local ways of manufacturing products. 
If I may, I would use this opportunity to add the following: it 
seems to me that we essentially agree on many issues.  In 
particular, I share with most of you here your skepticism 
concerning the benefits of the EU-type of specific protection for 
GIs.  On both sides of the Atlantic, however, we also should be 
aware of the risks inherent in a situation when specific protection 
is lacking. 
Take the example of Rwandan coffee Justin mentioned a while 
ago.  There may be a vulnerable time when a country tries to 
develop the marketing potential of its designations in a given 
foreign target country.  The local consumers may not be aware of 
the product’s origin, and that its designation has some geographical 
meaning.  During this time, others might want to take advantage, 
either by registering a trademark analogous to this designation, or 
by using it so profusely all over the place that it becomes generic. 
One example for this phenomenon is the case of Basmati rice.  
People in India frequently complain about Basmati having become 
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generic in most Western countries, and about trademark 
registrations having been accepted for designations like Texmati or 
Kasmati.  They argue that the legal system should have stopped 
things like that in the first place. 
I ask myself whether we can achieve this sort of protection, 
which seems to have some merits, without imposing the 
overwrought system of GI protection that the European Union tries 
to promote on the international level.  Maybe one could attain 
results that are more sensible by resorting to general principles like 
prohibition of registration in bad faith.  However, I’m mentioning 
this only as a point for discussion.  I do have my questions and 
doubts about that. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: I am not a fan of the French 
regulations, but I do think the French regulations stabilize practices 
to some degree.  They do innately when the Institut National des 
Appellations d’Origine says, “You must make your PONT 
L’EVÊQUE cheese this way” or “ you must make your COMTÉ 
cheese this way” or “you must make your ROQUEFORT cheese 
this way.”100  In effect, it eliminates competition and it makes life 
simpler for farmers or makers of a given cheese, because they 
know exactly what they have to do to qualify for the GIs they need 
to market their products. 
Of course, what has happened to the French wine industry is, 
while things were stabilized internally, the meanings of wines were 
standardized, and competition was in some sense curbed by a 
fixing of practice, New Zealanders, Australians, Americans and 
Argentines, who do compete, who change their wines, have 
absolutely pummeled the French wine industry in the global 
marketplace in the past ten years. 
So the problem is, even if you try to stabilize a product 
nationally, and therefore stabilize some cultural element, you are 
still going to nonetheless face global competitive pressures.  I think 
that the French lesson is a cautionary tale demonstrating that while 
 
 100 Hughes, supra note 3, at 307–08, 332.  See generally Justin Hughes, Recoding 
Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 926–28 
(1999) (asserting that even passive audiences have an interest in stabilizing and 
protecting cultural objects through copyright and trademark law). 
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there may be some value in stabilizing a cultural or local practice, 
this does not mean that such a practice is going to survive if it must 
face the changing, evolving, and improving practices of other 
countries. 
DR. KUR: To the contrary, I think this might be a basic flaw of 
the French policy.  If one relies too heavily on GIs designations for 
protection, thinking that he or she is safe since nobody else may 
use those terms, there is a risk this will neglect the demands of the 
market.  Prices increase because of the protected designations, and 
producers lose sight of the fact that consumers are clever enough to 
notice that products bearing other names may be just as good, and 
consequently will no longer be willing to pay higher prices for the 
protected goods. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Yes.  One of the fascinating 
questions here—and then we will go to some other questions—is 
we do not know how valuable individual trademarks are, and we 
do not really know how valuable graphical indications or 
individual geographical indications are. 
When Spain joined the European Union, Spanish sparkling 
wine makers had to give up the word “champagne.”  They adopted 
the word CAVA.  Nonetheless, they are selling millions of cases 
more of their sparkling wine than when they used the word 
“champagne.”  Now, there are all kinds of things you cannot 
control for—the increasing wealth in Spain, Spanish access to the 
European market—but it is not necessarily the case that 
“champagne” was such a valuable mark for them to begin with. 
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: Let me just add quickly that none of 
these arguments go to whether or not the marks are harmful.  They 
just go to whether or not you also need a good business method to 
support the mark.  The French farmers could certainly abandon 
those designations and make wine in an industrial way if they 
chose to, so it is just a matter of what you do with your mark once 
you’ve got it. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Hold on.  Some of them are making 
wine in an industrial way already. 
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: That’s true too. 
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PROFESSOR HUGHES: I won’t let you get away with that 
one, because French appellation cheeses actually have four 
categories: Fermier, Artisanal, Coopérative, and Industriel,101 so 
the French regulation itself recognizes that French appellation 
cheeses are—a certain large amount of them—made in industrial 
production facilities. 
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: Fair enough, but the point is that GIs 
are just one element that may contribute to commercial success.  
We certainly don’t advise entrepreneurs to forego registration of 
trademarks because they may or may not prove valuable. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Yes, sir, you have a question? 
QUESTION: Yes.  Britton Payne.  I am from the Intellectual 
Property Journal here at Fordham. 
Professor Scafidi, you were talking about authenticity and 
geographical indications strengthening community.  That is 
certainly something we hear about every two years—really in 
every election cycle we have—about ways to strengthen 
community, so I am curious as to the extent that geographical 
indications work to this end in the United States.  I ask this as a 
person who grew up in New Jersey and watched our two football 
teams play every game with the letters “NY” on their helmets. 
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: You are implying that there is culture 
in New Jersey? 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Payne]: You know what?  I am implying 
that there is culture in New Jersey.  Not only would I say that there 
is in fact culture in New Jersey, but that it is squashed, sort of in a 
reverse-GI problem, as it becomes subsumed into the state and city 
of New York.  I understand that you are making a joke, but I also 
understand that there is unprotected culture here. 
I also made a list—Philadelphia cheese steaks and cream 
cheese, Buffalo wings, Cajun catfish—all kinds of things that 
ought to indicate a regional pride and a local pride, but maybe do 
not because we see geographical indications as a private right 
rather than a public right.  So I am just curious, have geographical 
 
 101 KAZUKO MASUI & TOMOKO YAMADA, FRENCH CHEESES 28 (1996). 
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indications been effective in fostering a sense of community, not 
only in major metropolitan regions, but across the country? 
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: Sure.  Of course, when we think 
about GIs, again we do think of them as an Old World, rather than 
a New World, phenomenon.  We think about things that have been 
around for a very long time.  We think of our own society, modern 
American society, conversely, as quite mobile, and we think of it 
as eroding regional distinctions.  So I think in some ways it is hard 
for us, as Americans, to understand GIs at a very deep level. 
I meant no disrespect to New Jersey, but I do think that there 
are certainly regional cuisines, for example, in the United States 
that do serve as points of pride, with or without GIs.  Would it help 
to attach GIs to such foods? 
Well, you mentioned Philly cheese steaks.  My spouse is from 
a very, very small town in Pennsylvania, but the nearest large city 
is in fact Philadelphia.  He is appalled to see what passes for a 
Philly cheese steak elsewhere, and even to see this term 
commercialized in other places. 
With or without enforcement power, there is a response, so I do 
think that we have an intuition accepting of the concept of GIs, 
even if we do not acknowledge it in the legal system in the same 
manner as we do other things. 
MR. PLEVAN: If I may just comment, for those of you who 
read the obituary pages, about six months ago the inventor of the 
Philadelphia cheese steak passed away.102  From a confusion point 
of view, even if you get what you would consider a terrible 
substitute for a Philadelphia cheese steak—let’s say in the airport 
in Los Angeles—I do not think you would think it was flown in 
from Philadelphia.  Cheese steaks are something that inherently, 
like French fries—or as we called them for a while, Freedom 
fries—nobody really believes are produced in the place they are 
named after.  We could say the same, I suppose, of Danish pastry, 
although maybe you could have a different view on that—if it is 
fresh Danish pastry, it is not likely that it came in on the Concorde. 
 
 102 Harry Olivieri, 90, Co-inventor of the Cheese Steak, in Philadelphia, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 22, 2006, at C10. 
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There are a lot of names like this that you just eliminate 
immediately saying, “nobody really would think that they were 
made in Philadelphia,” even though I understand maybe we could 
have a certification mark that would standardize Philadelphia 
cheese steaks, but I doubt it. 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Can I go to what Lynne would call 
30,000 feet with you on this?  What you are really asking is part of 
a fundamental debate or dynamic in this area.  That is, technology 
immigrates, and when technology immigrates, the terminology of 
the technology immigrates as well.  That is why in Spanish the 
word for my PC is computador and why in Malaysia you watch a 
televisi. 
As food technology migrates, the terminology migrates.  That 
is what a recipe is when it has a geographic name; it is technology 
migrating and it is the terminology for the technology migrating.  
We simply have to decide as a policy matter when that happens 
and when it does not.  Trademark people call it “genericization.”103  
You do not even think when you see a restaurant down this avenue 
advertising “Chinese food” that that is a geographic indication 
anymore.  It is a recipe description, or a description of a category 
of recipes. 
So what we really have to decide is when we should let the 
terminology migrate with the technology and when we should not.  
Now when you pick up Wine Spectator, you see “California Rhone 
wines.”  What does that mean?  Well, California Rhones are 
supposedly Rhone-style wines, produced by Californians using 
winemaking technology from the Rhone Valley.  I am ambivalent 
about this.  It is merely a certain style of winemaking and a certain 
style of wine, and the word comes with it.  This is exactly what 
Susan has been talking about today. 
As an immigrant nation, it is a huge issue.  Do we let the 
Italians who make ice cream keep calling it gelato?  So I think that 
you have really touched on a fundamental dynamic here. 
Other questions? 
 
 103 See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 38, § 12:1. 
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QUESTION: I would like to build on that.  Is part of the 
problem that there are not enough generic terms in use that could 
take the place of GI-protected terms?  Is this blurring between 
generic terms and GIs causing these problems?  Take, for 
Example, CHAMPAGNE: instead of saying that CHAMPAGNE 
describes a particular product, CHAMPAGNE could serve solely 
as GI , so that the producers of champagne would have to use the 
term “sparkling wine” along with the rest of the world.  You would 
have an isolated the geographic indicator, and then you could say, 
“This is a Napa Valley sparkling wine versus a champagne 
sparkling wine.” 
In terms of spirits, you have Scotch whisky, Canadian whisky, 
and Tennessee whiskey.  Anybody who drinks whiskey recognizes 
the term whiskey.  The prior geographical label simply identifies 
the location in which distillers produce a given brand of whiskey. 
In order to expand this method into other markets, could we not 
mandate the use of more descriptive terms for products while 
allowing people to keep their geographical indicators? 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Well, I will turn it over to the panel, 
but part of the answer is that one of the reasons we use geographic 
words is for evocative purposes.  When we say “Buffalo wings” 
instead of “really hot chicken wings,” we are using it for a little 
evocative purpose: to connect back to the origin of the thing or the 
origin of the recipe.  “Thai-style” something or “Thai food” may 
be just signifying that there is lemon grass and cilantro in it.  We 
use many geographic words evocatively, and you have to also 
think about protecting these uses. 
So I don’t think it’s as simple as you think it is, or as simple as 
you suggested it might be. 
DR. KUR: One basic difficulty would be: at what point in time 
do you decide how specific you want to be?  For instance, 
ROQUEFORT cheese would obviously not do.  From the 
beginning, you would have to use the term “Roquefort bleu 
cheese,” or something like it, and even “bleu cheese” might as 
such not be specific enough, so I see a problem there. 
Apart from that, it is difficult to control the way in which 
people refer to a product in common parlance, i.e. when they 
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simply omit the generic term, or are not specific enough in the way 
they refer to a given type of product.  Who is to blame if that 
happens?  Who has to bear the consequences? 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Go for it, Susan. 
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: Predictably, I like the suggestion to a 
degree, but I would say that what Annette is describing is the issue 
of reification of culture.  Culture flows.  We do not want to freeze 
it at any point in time, even if we do want to give the people who 
originated something the right to continue to claim a cultural 
affiliation with it, so I think that is at the heart of the problem. 
That said, I also want to distinguish between the commercial 
use of the term for evocative or descriptive purposes and for casual 
personal shorthand.  I think that, even if we go ahead and register 
GIs, people will continue in popular parlance to call Roquefort 
cheese “Roquefort cheese,” as opposed to “Roquefort-style bleu 
cheese.” 
PROFESSOR HUGHES: But there is an efficiency issue too.  
Are you comfortable calling all hamburgers from now on “ground 
beef patty sandwiches?” After all “hamburger” is a geographic 
word itself.  Hamburgers, frankfurters—I think people 
underestimate the extent to which our terminology is actually 
based in geography. 
Other questions? 
[No response] 
We have exhausted the audience, with three minutes to spare. 
Hugh, may we declare this session ended?  All right.  Thank 
you very much, ladies and gentlemen. 
